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The A.L.I.’s Proposed Distributive Principle
of “Limiting Retributivism”:
Does It Mean in Practice Anything Other
than Pure Desert?
Paul H. Robinson†
Let me first note how pleased I am that the A.L.I. has
undertaken the new Sentencing Project Report.
Sentencing has been a central focus of national debate for
several decades. It is just the kind of difficult and
contentious issue on which the A.L.I., with its expertise
and credibility, can make a unique and important
contribution.
The new sentencing project raises a host of wonderful
issues on which I could say something. I have written a
good deal about structuring sentencing decision making,1
for example. But because there are no specific proposals on
these matters I thought I would use this space to comment
on that aspect of project that has resulted in at least a
sample proposed black letter text: the official statement of
the “purposes” that are to guide decision makers in
sentencing.
The proposed principle for distributing criminal
sanctions is an important step forward from the existing
Model Penal Code section 1.02, which offers only a facade
of guidance. By listing a host of purposes without defining
their interrelation, the current provision offers no real
guidance; different purposes will suggest different
sentences and the provision gives no guidance in selecting
among the possibilities. Worse, it is subject to conscious or
subconscious abuse. It lets a judge first settle on a result,
† Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
1. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, A Sentencing System for the 21st Century?, 66
Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1987); Paul H. Robinson, Legality and Discretion in the
Distribution of Criminal Sanctions, 25 Harv. J. on Legis. 393 (1988); Paul H.
Robinson, One Perspective on Sentencing Reform, 8 Crim. L.F. 1 (1997); Paul H.
Robinson, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines Ten Years Later: An Introduction
and Comments, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1231 (1997).
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then work backwards to offer as its justification whichever
of the listed purposes supports that result. This is not
The Report’s proposed
principled decision making.2
provision offers a true distributive principle that tells
decision makers with greater clarity what criteria should
guide their judgments.3
The Report adopts as its principle what it describes as
“limiting retributivism,” an approach it attributes to
Norval Morris. I have some reservations about “limiting
retributivism” as Morris and others have advanced it, but I
do not have reservations about the Report’s proposed
principle, for reasons I will explain.
On the contrary, I very much support it. But I do so
because I believe that in practice the Report’s proposal will
produce a very different distributive principle than the
advocates of “limiting retributivism” would want.
This leaves me with a dilemma. To explain what I
think is so attractive about the Report’s proposal, I must
explain what I think the true effect of the proposal will be,
and that explanation may serve only to undermine its
support among the “limiting retributivism” advocates. I
have decided to proceed despite the risk, however,
comforted in the fact that people are commonly
unpersuaded by what I say.
With regard to determining punishment, the proposed
distributive principle might be outlined in this way:
(i) In determining punishment, look to the extent of
the
offender’s
blameworthiness
(including
the
seriousness of the offense),
(ii) but reliance upon the traditional utilitarian
purposes of rehabilitation, general deterrence, and
incapacitation of the dangerous, as well as “restoration of
crime victims and communities,” is permitted where the
purpose can effectively be achieved,

2. See Paul H. Robinson, Hybrid Principles for the Distribution of Criminal
Sanctions, 82 Nw U. L. Rev. 19 (1987) [hereinafter Hybrid].
3. For a remaining caveat on its success in this regard, see infra text
accompanying note 13.
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(iii) but such reliance may not produce punishment
in
conflict
with
the
offender’s
degree
of
blameworthiness.4
What will be the instances under this proposal in
which the distribution of punishment will be guided by a
principle other than desert? The answer, I suggest, is: not
many. (By “punishment according to desert” I mean
punishment according to the offender’s personal
blameworthiness for the past offense, which takes account
not only of the seriousness of the offense but also the full
range of culpability, capacity, and situational factors that
we understand to affect an offender’s blameworthiness.5)
I. THE LIMITATIONS ON PERMITTED DEVIATION FROM
DESERT DUE TO THE PROPOSAL’S EFFECTIVENESS
REQUIREMENT
Reliance upon non-desert purposes will be seriously
limited, first, by the fact that those purposes commonly
cannot effectively be achieved, and thus are excluded from
use by paragraph (ii) of the proposed distributive principle.
Consider each of the traditional utilitarian purposes in
turn. As the Report concedes, there are limits to the
effectiveness one can expect from rehabilitation programs.6
As is becoming apparent from social science research,
our realistic expectations for the effectiveness of deterrence
also are fading, as John Darley and I have detailed
elsewhere.7 Potential offenders commonly do not know the
4. See American Law Institute, Model Penal Code: Sentencing, Report 129, §
1.02(2)(a)(i)-(ii) (April 11, 2003) [hereinafter Report]. The provision also requires
that a sentence be no more severe than is necessary to achieve the applicable
purpose, but I take this to be inherent in the requirement of fixing punishment
according to an offender’s blameworthiness (and inherent in the efficient
achievement of the utilitarian purposes).
5. Some writers, typically opponents of a desert distribution, offer a much
more limited notion of desert, but all thoughtful desert advocates that I know
essentially support the description I have offered here. More on this issue at infra
text accompanying notes 21-22.
6. American Law Institute, Report, supra note 4, at 28-31.
7. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A
Social Science Investigation, 24 Oxford J. Legal Stud. (forthcoming 2004); Paul H.
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legal rules, either directly or indirectly, even those rules
that have been explicitly formulated to produce a deterrent
effect. Even if they know the rules, the cost-benefit
analysis potential offenders perceive—which is the only
cost-benefit analysis that matters in deterrence—commonly
leads to a conclusion suggesting violation rather than
compliance, either because the perceived likelihood of
punishment is so small, or because it is so distant as to be
highly discounted, or for a variety of other reasons. And,
even if they know the legal rules and perceive a cost-benefit
analysis that urges compliance, potential offenders
commonly cannot or will not bring such knowledge to bear
to guide their conduct in their own best interests, due to a
variety of social, situational, or chemical influences. Even
if no one of these three hurdles is fatal to law’s deterrent
influence, their cumulative effect typically is fatal.8

Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of
Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 Geo. L.J. 949 (2003).
8. Even if the prerequisites to deterrence did exist, using deterrence as a
distributive principle faces other serious challenges. First, such use requires
information that is not available, and not likely to be available any time in the
foreseeable future, and requires a complexity of analysis that is beyond our
current or foreseeable capacity. Second, any distributive principle for criminal
liability and punishment will produce some deterrent effect (if any is to be had).
A deterrence-based distribution makes sense only if it can provide meaningfully
greater deterrent effect than that already inherent in competing distributions
that advance other valuable goals, such as doing justice. Finally, even if one
assumes for the sake of argument that a deterrence-based distribution could
produce a greater deterrent effect than a justice-based distribution, there is
reason to be concerned that the deterrence-based distribution also produces more
crime because its conflicts with the community’s shared intuitions of justice and
thereby undercuts the criminal law’s moral credibility, lessening its crime-control
power as a moral authority, a dynamic that can have significant crimogenic effect.
There are possibilities for reform, but also serious limitations, due in large
part to the sacrifices such reforms would demand: in greater financial cost, in
infringing interests of privacy and freedom from governmental intrusion, in
compromising basic notions of procedural fairness, and in doing injustice and
failing to do justice. A realistic view of deterrence, even after plausible reforms
are made, would have little increase in the deterrent effect of doctrinal
manipulation, and not enough to justify its continued use as the standard
mechanism of criminal-law making analysis. See Robinson & Darley, Does
Criminal Law Deter? A Social Science Investigation, supra note 7; Robinson &
Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its
Worst When Doing Its Best, supra note 7.
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There seems little doubt that having a criminal justice
system that punishes violators, as every organized society
has, does have a deterrent effect; having a punishment
system does deter. But accumulating evidence increasingly
suggests that there is little added deterrent effect that can
be derived from the manipulation of criminal law rules for
the distribution of criminal liability and punishment within
that system.
It is true that incapacitation undoubtedly works to
prevent future crime. Prison terms, for example, do
prevent offenders from reoffending, at least against the
unimprisoned population. But as I have argued elsewhere,9
while incapacitation works, it also incurs serious costs,
including costs in effective crime prevention. Using the
criminal justice system for such preventive detention,
rather than providing such detention in a more open and
explicit fashion, both produces unnecessarily ineffective
prevention and subverts justice. Both society and potential
detainees would be better off if such preventive detention
purposes were not cloaked as criminal justice but advanced
openly and honestly in an explicit system of preventive
detention.
The community would be better off because an openly
preventive system offers both more justice and increased
protection from dangerous offenders. Giving the criminal
justice system a better chance of doing justice is valuable
for its own sake. It also creates greater moral credibility
for the system, and thus greater long-term crime-control
power.10 An explicit preventive detention system also offers
better protection, because it can directly consider a person’s
present dangerousness and more accurately predict who is
dangerous. Such a system also enhances accuracy by
allowing for periodic re-evaluations, in comparison with the
present system’s need to make a single prediction of
9. See Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive
Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 1429 (2001) [hereinafter
Dangerousness].
10. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U.
L. Rev. 453 (1997).
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dangerousness years in advance. Greater accuracy leads to
more detention of the dangerous, better protection, and less
detention of the nondangerous, thus saving resources.
Segregating preventive detention from criminal justice
also benefits the potential detainees for many of the same
reasons.
Better accuracy in prediction means less
detention of nondangerous offenders.
Periodic reevaluation leads to detention limited to periods of actual
dangerousness. Acknowledging the preventive nature of
the detention also logically suggests a right to treatment, a
right to nonpunitive conditions, and the application of the
principle of minimum restraint, meaning greater freedom
among those who are detained.11
The purpose of “restoration of crime victims and
communities” presents a situation similar in some respects
to incapacitation. There is evidence that “restorative”
processes, such as sentencing circles, victim-offender
mediation, and family group conferences, do work, in the
11. See Robinson, Dangerousness, supra note 9:
Beyond the new limitations imposed on it, an open system of
preventive detention ought to be preferred precisely because it is open
rather than cloaked. No one can guarantee that a legislature or court will
not attempt to abuse its power. But an open system makes it harder to
abuse the system. The openly preventive nature of the system makes it
susceptible to closer scrutiny, which the present cloaked system escapes.
Instead of the current debates—which typically reduce to disagreements
about, for example, whether “three strikes” sentences are “too long”—the
debate would shift to the many aspects of preventive detention that cry out
for debate: What is the reliability of the predictions of dangerousness? Is
the threatened danger sufficient to justify the extent of intrusion on
personal liberty? Are there less expensive or less intrusive measures that
would as effectively protect the community? Under the current cloaked
system, these issues escape examination and debate.
Imagine a legislature considering an explicit preventive detention
statute that would provide life preventive detention on a third conviction
for a minor fraud offense . . . . Such legislation would be difficult to defend
and would be unlikely to find support in any political quarter. Indeed,
imagine the Supreme Court’s review of Rummel if Rummel were being
preventively detained. Life terms without the possibility of parole may be
common and acceptable in a criminal justice system, in which horrible
crimes deserve severe punishment. But life commitment with no further
dangerousness review for a property offense would be preposterous on its
face in a civil preventive detention system.
Id. at 1455.
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sense that they can help “restore” victims and communities
and can have a modest effect in reducing crime by the same
offenders in the future. But depending on how they are
used, restorative processes also can produce more future
crime.
For example, they may produce results that
seriously deviate from shared community intuitions of
justice and, thus, can undercut the criminal law’s moral
credibility and thereby its power to gain compliance as a
moral authority that can harness social norms.12
The incapacitation and “restoration” purposes reveal a
weakness in the Report’s proposed distributive principle: it
does not seem to allow one to take into account the costs of
advancing a purpose—for example, its crime-producing
effects—that may outweigh its benefits—such as its crimeprevention effects. The proposed text authorizes reliance
upon one of the enumerated goals when it is possible “to
serve [the] goals.” Thus, as long as the goal is being
satisfied—rehabilitation, general deterrence, incapacitation,
or “restoration of crime victims and communities”—the
Report’s test would authorizes reliance upon it even if such
While the
would seriously increase future crime!
enumerated purposes have traditionally and primarily been
justified as crime reduction mechanisms, the proposed text
language does not actually require such.
A second flaw in the proposed distributive principle is
its failure to give guidance in selecting among the
enumerated purposes when more than one of those
purposes meets the “realistic prospect of success” test and
the alterative purposes suggest different distributions. If
both incapacitation and “restoration,” for example, have a
“realistic prospect of success” but suggest different
sentences, as they commonly would, which purpose should
be advanced? The provision fails to tell us, thus essentially
leaving it to the unbridled discretion of the sentencing
judge, with all of the potential for abuse and disparity in
treatment of similar cases that such discretion brings.
12. See Paul H. Robinson, The Virtues of Restorative Processes, the Vices of
Restorative Justice, in Symposium on Restorative Justice, 2003 Utah L. Rev. 375;
Robinson & Darley, The Utility of Desert, supra note 10.
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Recall that a similar (albeit more disabling) failure of this
sort has been part of the criticism of current Model Penal
Code section 1.02(2).13 For reasons I explain immediately
below, the practical effect of these flaws in the proposed
distributive principle may be limited.
II. THE LIMITATIONS ON PERMITTED DEVIATION FROM
DESERT DUE TO DESERT’S ORDINAL RANKING DEMANDS
Compared to this first limitation on non-desert
distributive principles—the difficulty in showing that such
purposes can be achieved or achieved without causing more
crime than they avoid—the second constraint on the
influence of the enumerated non-desert purposes is more
important and dramatic in its effect: the “limiting
retributivism” distributive principle will in practice be
primarily a desert distributive principle because of the
proposed text’s demand that no distribution of punishment
may conflict with the demands of desert.
Contrary to the assumption of the original advocates of
“limiting retributivism”—that desert provides only vague
outer limits on punishment—desert has quite specific
demands, driven in large part by the demand of ordinal
ranking.
Desert demands that a case of greater
blameworthiness receive greater punishment than a case of
comparatively less blameworthiness.14 Given the limited
range of punishments a liberal democracy ought to be
willing to inflict, distinguishing cases of distinguishable
blameworthiness means that the deserved punishment in
any given case will fall within a narrow range on the
punishment continuum.
This deontological conclusion (that desert requires a
rather specific amount of punishment in order to properly
rank it against other cases) turns out to be entirely
consistent with recent social science research that reveals
fairly sophisticated intuitions of justice shared by lay
13. See text accompanying supra note 3.
14. See Andrew von Hirsch, Past or Future Crimes: Deservedness and
Dangerousness in the Sentencing of Criminals ch. 4 (1985).

2/25/2004 3:00 PM

ROBINSONMACRO

2003]

LIMITING RETRIBUTIVISM

11

persons.15 Small changes in facts can alter the consensus
view of the comparative blameworthiness of an offender
and, thus, the relative punishment that lay persons see the
offender as deserving.
This characteristic of desert—its demand that
distinguishable degrees of blameworthiness result in
distinguishable amounts of punishment—means that
desert demands specific amounts of punishment, not vague
limitations on it, and this, in turn, has important
implications: even where the enumerated non-desert
purposes pass the Report proposal’s effectiveness test, the
purposes will rarely be used because such use would
commonly conflict with desert.16 And where they do not
conflict—where they give the same result as a desert
distribution—they are irrelevant.
That is, non-desert
purposes are relevant only to the extent that they suggest a
distribution of punishment different from desert, yet such
deviation is expressly forbidden by the Report’s proposal!
I don’t want to overstate the case. There will be
instances where a non-desert distribution will not conflict
with desert. For example, desert generally cares about
punishment amount, not punishment method.17 Thus, once
the punishment amount is determined, one could look to
any number of non-desert purposes to determine how that
fixed amount of punishment is to be imposed.18 One might
15. See Paul H. Robinson & John Darley, Justice, Liability, and Blame:
Community Views and the Criminal Law (1995) [hereinafter Justice, Liability,
and Blame]; Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Objectivist vs. Subjectivist
Views of Criminality: A Study in the Role of Social Science in Criminal Law
Theory, 18 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 409 (1998); Paul H. Robinson & John Darley,
Testing Competing Theories of Justification, 76 N.C. L. Rev. 1095 (1998).
16. See, e.g., Robinson, Hybrid, supra note 2, at 22-28; Dangerousness, supra
note 9, at 1439-1443.
17. Not everyone would agree with this conclusion. Dan Kahan, for example,
would argue that there sometimes is no substitute for a sentence of imprisonment
as a means of signaling the seriousness of the offense. Dan M. Kahan, What Do
Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 591 (1996).
18. See Paul H. Robinson, Desert, Crime Control, Disparity, and Units of
Punishment, in Penal Theory and Practice: Tradition and Innovation in Criminal
Justice 93 (Antony Duff et al. eds., 1994); Robert E. Harlow, John M. Darley &
Paul H. Robinson, The Severity of Intermediate Penal Sanctions: A
Psychophysical Scaling Approach for Obtaining Community Perceptions, 11 J.
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look to the special circumstances of each case to determine
whether the punishment method should maximize
incapacitation or restoration, or even rehabilitation or
general deterrence if the special circumstances exist that
make achievement of such purposes possible.19
Ultimately, I predict that the Report’s proposed
distributive principle, with its prohibition of any
distribution that conflicts with desert, will look almost
exclusively to the desert principle in determining the
amount of punishment to be imposed, both because many of
the non-desert purposes cannot effectively be achieved and
because those that can be achieved can do so only by
deviating from desert.
As I noted at the start, there is the danger that my
remarks here will undercut support for the Report among
traditional “limiting retributivism” advocates, who often
disapprove of a pure desert distribution. It seems likely,
however, that they will simply ignore these remarks,
comfortable in their conception of desert as having limited
practical effect—as simply barring grossly disproportionate
punishment. Perhaps they will be prompted to make clear
in a carefully prepared legislative history for the proposed
text the notion of desert upon which their drafting relies. I
hope that move makes them feel better.
It will not make me feel worse. For the truth is that
desert is not a notion that is a creature of academics or one
that can be controlled by a prepared legislative history.
When the text says that the distribution of punishment
must reflect “the blameworthiness of the offender,” those
words refer to a concept, blameworthiness, that has a strong
and clear intuitive meaning, one shared among most lay
persons and many criminal justice professionals, and it is
that view of desert that will in the longer term have its say.

Quantitative Criminology 71 (1995).
19. Of course, there remains the troublesome failure of the proposed principle
to articulate which among the enumerated non-desert purposes is to be served
when more than one of those purposes could be achieved but where the different
purposes suggest different methods of punishment. See text accompanying supra
note 13.
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III. TWO KINDS OF OPPOSITION TO DESERT
In closing, let me address the more basic issue that
drives the debate: whether people should be concerned
about a distributive principle that looks purely to desert in
determining amount of punishment. It seems unlikely that
anything I can say here could change minds on such a
fundamental issue, but one never knows.
My experience suggests that there are two kinds of
people who oppose a desert distributive principle: those
who misunderstand it, and those who think justice less
important than crime reduction. A brief comment to each
group:
To the first group, who think desert is harsh and
insensitive—often in the form of an eye-for-an-eye view of
desert, in which anger and humiliation play a role20—I say
that they should energetically oppose desert, if it really
meant what they think it means. But, as I have already
suggested in my definition of “desert” at the start of these
remarks,21 their view of desert is in error and has been in
error for many decades. As far as I know, every thoughtful
modern proponent of desert envisions a system that takes
account of every aspect of an offense and an offender that
alters our assessment of an offender’s blameworthiness.
Yes, it is true, people disagree about what affects
blameworthiness. The most dramatic example I can think
of is that some people think that resulting harm ought to
increase punishment while others think it ought not and
that the focus should be only on things like one’s conduct,
culpability, and capacities. But that kind of disagreement
is found in every distributive principle.
People will
disagree about what factors ought to be taken into account
in a system built on general deterrence or incapacitation.
Indeed, in some respects, desert is more subject to
definitive determination than any other distributive
principle because one can with some precision determine at
20. See, for example, the papers for this symposium by Ed Rubin and James
Whitman.
21. See supra note 5.
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least what the members of the community governed by a
criminal justice system think are the relevant factors,22
while it is very difficult to get reliable data on the most
basic factors for non-desert purposes. (More on this in a
moment.) If the fear is that lack of complete agreement as
to what constitutes desert may produce unduly harsh
punishments, one need only look at the variety of current
objectionable sentencing practices—such as “three
strikes”—to see that the far more prominent producers of
harsh punishment are the non-desert distributive
principles, such as general deterrence and incapacitation.
Indeed, the harshness of the current system may be
attributed in largest part to the move to rehabilitation,
incapacitation, and deterrence, which disconnected
criminal punishment from the constraint of just desert.
A word to the second group, those who object to a desert
distribution because it condemns us to needlessly suffer
avoidable crimes. Their objection is not based upon an error,
as is the case with the first group, but upon an entirely
legitimate view that doing justice may be nice but avoiding
crime is more important. To this group I would argue that
they may overestimate the crime reduction potential of nondesert purposes, and underestimate the crime reduction
effect naturally inherent in a desert distribution. As I noted
above, rehabilitation and general deterrence have limited
crime prevention effectiveness, and incapacitation and
“restoration” may work but may have serious crimogenic
costs. It is too early for us to know how the numbers will
crunch, but I would suggest to this second group that they
ought to at least be open to a conclusion that, when the
numbers are crunched, a desert distribution will be seen as
reducing crime more effectively than distributions that
conflict with desert, and which thereby undercut the
criminal law’s moral authority with the community.23
The larger point here is that this is an empirical issue.
No one can make crime reduction arguments with complete
22. On the issue of the significance of resulting harm, for example, see
Robinson, Justice, Liability, and Blame, supra note 15, at Studies 1 & 17.
23. See Robinson, Utility of Desert, supra note 10.
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authority because we simply don’t have—and are not likely
in the near future to have—sufficient information to give a
reliable answer as to what distribution produces the least
crime. My point is that, in the absence of the information
necessary to know what kind of distribution will work best,
doesn’t it make sense in the interim at least to do what we
know we can do: do justice?

